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PROGRAM This Week with David Brinkley STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network

DATE November 10, 1985 11:30 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Interview with Mr. Sagdeev and Professor Shulman

DAVID BRINKLEY: ...We'll be back with the President's adviser on arms control, the head of Russia's space program, and a special list in the study of the Soviet Union.

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BRINKLEY: Two leaders who have never met, each well supplied with preconceived notions about the other. Their meetings are scheduled to last a total of eight hours. Since neither speaks the other's language, every word will have to be translated, which effectively gives them four hours to talk and negotiate, not much.

But before we ask our guests what they think might happen in these four hours, here's some background on what led up to the summit from John Martin.

JOHN MARTIN: With barely a week before the summit, David, the pace of maneuvering has accelerated. A series of events, some orchestrated by the superpowers and some not, has begun to change expectations.

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: I hope my discussions with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva will be fruitful and will lead to future meetings.

MARTIN: Yesterday, in a Voice of America broadcast to the Soviet Union and the world, President Reagan stated a theme that is starting to emerge: The summit itself may produce no breakthrough on arms control, possibly not even a significantly better understanding. But it is important to try.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Americans are a peace-loving people. We do not threaten your nation, and never will. The American people are tolerant, slow to anger, but staunch in defense of their liberties and, like you, their country.

MARTIN: One event that altered the tone for the President and his advisers was this meeting in Moscow, where Secretary of State George Shultz and chief arms control adviser Paul Nitze met with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Later, Mr. Shultz met with Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and reportedly found the Soviet leader argumentative, unfamiliar with the rationale of American policy, at times blunt, and in no sense yielding.

In Washington, Mr. Reagan turned the other cheek.

REPORTER: Were you disturbed by [inaudible] behavior?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Not yet.

DIMITRI SIMES: No important agreements can be reached at the summit. Very important consequences can follow the summit.

MARTIN: That is the assessment of Soviet-born analyst Dimitri Simes, who has concluded that Mr. Gorbachev's bluntness was not a negotiating ploy.

SIMES: Mr. Gorbachev is trying to do two things simultaneously. First of all, he's trying to make very clear to his own constituency that he is not a pushover, that he's not naive, that he has no illusions about U.S. intentions.

Mr. Gorbachev's second objective is to communicate essentially the same message to the United States.

MARTIN: At this week's celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution, the traditional Moscow parade included traditional denunciations of American threats to peace. But some observers said the rhetoric was muted, and no new weapons were displayed.

This past week, the two countries adjourned their arms control negotiations in Geneva and agreed to resume talking early next year. They are studying proposals by Mr. Gorbachev to reduce offensive missiles by 50 percent on both sides and by Mr. Reagan to vary the mix of weapons reductions in a way he believes would be safer and fairer.

Both sides now propose to limit the number of nuclear charges to 6000, total. There is a dispute on definitions and no agreement from the United States to renounce research into a

defensive shield based in space that would protect against missile attack.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: When this interview is over...

MARTIN: At one point this past week, in an interview by Soviet reporters published in Izvestia, Mr. Reagan was quoted as saying a space shield, called SDI, would be deployed only after all offensive weapons were eliminated, suggesting to some the Russians could veto it.

REPORTER: Mr. President, did you mean to give the Soviets a veto over Star Wars the other day?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Will you forgive me if I say, "Hell no"?

MARTIN: In his radio speech yesterday, Mr. Reagan clarified his position.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: If and when our research proves that a defensive shield against nuclear missiles is practical, I believe our two nations and those others that have nuclear weapons should come together and agree on how, gradually, to eliminate offensive nuclear weapons as we make our defensive system available to all.

MARTIN: Those were the major events orchestrated by diplomats and presidents. But there were two unexpected episodes, both on American soil, both involving Soviet defectors, real or imagined.

This man, Vitaly Yurchenko, turned up at the Soviet Embassy in Washington to declare he wanted to return to Moscow.

TRANSLATOR: Here, I was kept in isolation, forced to take some drugs, and denied the possibility to get in touch with official Soviet representatives.

My only wish is to return as soon as possible to my country, to my family, kin and friends.

MARTIN: For the CIA, which he said even took him to dinner with Director William Casey, the episode suggested it had either mismanaged a valuable defector or had been deceived by him. It denied kidnapping or drugging him.

Meanwhile, a Soviet sailor was being sought for more questioning after jumping ship in Louisiana, being refused asylum and returned forcibly to his vessel. A Senate committee issued a subpoena to question him and block his departure, even though the State Department and President Reagan, apparently anguished but

resigned, said the case was closed.

SENATOR JESSE HELMS: In my judgment, as soon as that ship gets on the high seas, he's a dead duck.

MARTIN: Because of the approaching summit, the episode created special tensions beyond concern for the sailor's safety.

When the ship was finally allowed to leave, the sailor, Miroslav Medvid, was believed on board.

The effect of these events in just the last seven days can't be measured easily against what might happen at the summit. Arms control adviser Nitze reportedly is predicting there could be an agreement on guidelines for future discussions. But the pace and intensity of events make it impossible to say what the complexion will be even next week, when we'll report from Geneva.

BRINKLEY: John, thank you.

Coming next Roald Sagdeev, Director of the Soviet Union's Space Research Institute, by satellite from Geneva. And shortly, Ambassador Paul Nitze, senior adviser to President Reagan on arms control; and Marshall Shulman, head of Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University.

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BRINKLEY: Mr. Sagdeev, in Geneva, by satellite, thank you very much for being with us today. A pleasure to have you with us.

Here with us are George Will of ABC News and Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent.

Now, Mr. Sagdeev, the Soviet Union insists that the United States must stop work on the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, while the U.S. insists that the Soviet Government has been developing the same thing for quite a long time. Now, could you clarify that for us?

ROALD SAGDEEV: I don't know where did you get the idea that we were developing these kinds of things during many years? If you mean the brochure prepared by Department of Defense and State Department, it is full of nonsense.

We are facing right now the moment of truth. It's not the moment for the bargaining. If the main reasoning on your side to continue SDI is the reference to the Russian efforts, we can simply sit down for serious talks and to agree to stop any kind of activity which you suspect on our side.

BRINKLEY: Well, you say this is the moment of truth, and not the time for bargaining. What exactly do you mean by that?

SAGDEEV: I think we were having negotiations during many years on arms reduction, on arms control. We were talking about different legs of strategic triad. Right now we are facing many more dangerous, much more dangerous type of arms buildup. It is expansion into the new dimension, into the space.

If one side or both sides would bring an armament into the earth orbit, it would be in future -- for future generations, I hope they would be much more clever than our generation is. It would be absolutely impossible to come back to negotiation table to agree about the counting rules. It would be much more difficult at that time.

GEORGE WILL: Mr. Sagdeev, in the President's speech at the United Nations he quoted a passage, a statement from the 1960s by Mr. Kosygin in which he said that defensive systems are not just a legitimate part of any nation's strategic arsenal, but they are a moral part, because they do not leave the people exposed to mass destruction.

When and why did the Soviet Union change its mind?

SAGDEEV: Probably President had in mind a very brief instantaneous, real-time conversation which were held at Glassboro during visit of Kosygin to United States. And I was told by several witnesses of that meeting how conversation was going on. And I am very proud for my leaders and for my people that afterwards of this very brief conversation, during next few months, few more years, we really appreciated the danger of ABM systems. And I think both sides came in 1972 to completely clear understanding of that danger.

WILL: Well, all right. Your answer, then, is that Mr. Kosygin really didn't mean it.

Now let's go on to something else.

As you know, the United States has virtually no defense against the penetration of its territory by Soviet bombers. We have none of the surface-to-air systems that you have, and almost no interceptor aircraft. You have more than 2000 interceptor aircraft and more than 10,000 surface-to-air launchers.

Why is it legitimate and good for the Soviet Union to defend against bomber-borne nuclear threats, but illegitimate and dangerous to defend against ballistic missiles? I don't see the point of principle here.

SAGDEEV: You know, if you come back to air defense, it has a very important historic routes. Never Soviet aircraft was crossing United States territory. And we Russians were witnessing how several times U-2 planes were flying over our country. And finally this particular event, the shooting down U-2 plane with pilot Powers, was the reason to end the idea for Eisenhower's visit to Russia.

WILL: Mr. Sagdeev, forgive me. But are you saying that you have 10,000 surface-to-air launchers and 2200 interceptor aircraft because the United States once flew U-2s over your territory? Clearly, you have a defensive system.

SAGDEEV: I just started -- I simply started with historical reasons. But they are very important. They are psychological reasons.

WILL: Why?

SAGDEEV: And behind psychology there is a momentum, inertia. And if you would start SDI research and development, you will have the same type of inertia, which would influence your next move in that direction.

WILL: Are you saying that the United States should permit you to have this very thick defense against United States aircraft because you have a psychological anxiety?

SAGDEEV: There is also a very important geographical difference. Our country is surrounded with forward-based nuclear systems, with aircraft carriers, with airfields in neighboring countries to our country.

SAM DONALDSON: Mr. Sagdeev, let me just turn to the Star Wars theme that the President has put forward, which is that if this technology proves successful, he wants to share it with the Soviet Union. The idea would be that both superpowers would have the same protective umbrella and that it would be phased in so that neither would have a first-strike capability while that phase-in was underway.

What's wrong with that?

SAGDEEV: There are -- I think there are two fallacies of this proposal. One is that you would never share technology with us. This is not...

DONALDSON: Well, the President says we would. Are you saying he's not telling the truth?

SAGDEEV: I mean [unintelligible] is much younger than the President, who is much older.

There is also another reason.

DONALDSON: When the President said that in his interview with four Soviet journalists, of course, Izvestia cut it out, so the Russian people wouldn't know of his offer. Why was that done?

SAGDEEV: Anyway, you are changing Presidents every four years. But this is not the bad idea. The bad idea [is] that the proposal, the promise which is given by one President is not fulfilled with the next one. It's like SALT II treaty.

But there is another reason. Suppose both sides would possess, anyhow, by a kind of miracle, this type of leak-proof shields. Then any physicist, any scientist could estimate quickly that the press button and fire from one defensive system against the other one would spend only small fraction of its firepower to kill the neighbor's defensive shield. And then we are coming back again to the absence-of-defense situation.

DONALDSON: So your position is, the Soviet position is that we should continue building offensive weapons, but not have a defensive shield against them. Is that correct?

SAGDEEV: Our position is that we should be brave enough to come to a joint political decision to reduce offensive weapons.

BRINKLEY: Mr. Sagdeev, thank you very much. Thank you for being with us today. We'll see you in Geneva.

Coming next, Professor Marshall Shulman of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University.

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BRINKLEY: Professor Shulman, in New York, thank you very much for coming in. It's always a pleasure to hear your thoughts. Thanks for coming.

Now, the leader of the Soviet Union -- this is from your standpoint. Tell me what you think -- Mr. Gorbachev, is rather new in office. A new Five Year Plan is being drawn up. The Congress meets in, what, two-three months?

MARSHALL SHULMAN: February. It meets in the last week of February and the first week in March.

BRINKLEY: Right. So, is this a good time for him to make any sort of deal with Mr. Reagan?

SHULMAN: Yes, it's a very good time, as he sees it, because his big priority is to try to repair the Soviet economy, to improve industrial technology and to raise productivity. And the very large diversion of their resources into the military sector, which we estimate at 12 to 14 percent of their GNP, is an impairment in what he regards as his main task.

WILL: Well now, I'd like to talk about his main task. The nomenclature of the class, the elite that makes the decisions in the Soviet Union is rather well taken care of, not surprisingly, by those decisions. They have vacations and cars and apartments and all the rest. Some people have said that we have a military-industrial complex, the Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex.

What evidence do you have that Gorbachev wants to do anything more than make the production of military instruments more efficient? That is, do you have any evidence that he really wants to put a Cusinart in every Soviet apartment?

SHULMAN: No. There are two separate things involved, Mr. Will. It isn't necessarily that he's going to transform the life of consumers in the country. But for a long time the Soviets have been concerned that the base of their industrial technology has been lagging behind, and they've been trying to do something about it. Gorbachev has made it his point that the priority for the Soviet Union is to modernize the industrial sector, to raise productivity. About that, I have no question he's very serious.

WILL: He is. And his approach appears to be more order and less vodka. Now, is that evidence of a -- what do we know about his temperament from this? Some people say that his emphasis on order and abstemiousness and all the rest indicates that this is a Stalinist temperament.

SHULMAN: No, I don't think so. It's not a personal matter with him.

The alcoholism laws, which are astonishing. I was over there when they were passed, and it was amazing to me how much mineral water I had to drink when I was talking to the party people. But that's only part of the first phase of what he's doing, which has to do with work discipline, absenteeism, and the rest of it. That's the minor part.

The big part is apt to come after the Party Congress, when he'll address some of the structural problems of the Soviet economy. And they're serious. They're formidable.

Whether he's going to be able to do it or not, I think

no one can say. But he is very serious about making an effort. And he has made a number of personal changes, about 30 percent of his regional party people, many of his major ministries, which give him at least a chance that he can modernize the economy.

DONALDSON: Mr. Shulman, for a long time the U.S. position on summits was that they ought to be carefully prepared, that they ought to have an agreed agenda, and that they're ought to be a reasonable prospect of success before you went into it. Well, none of those conditions are apparently going to be met in this summit in Geneva. And does that augur well for the outcome?

SHULMAN: It doesn't augur well for this outcome if no positions change. The crucial point on this summit, as Sagdeev was trying to say, but I think may not have come across very clearly, is, from the Soviet point of view, the main question is whether the United States proposes to go beyond fundamental research into testing and development on the new weapons.

What worries them, I think, is not whether it's going to work or not, but it is that on the way to the kind of priorities that the SDI has, a period which emphasizes boost phase -- that is, weapons in orbit over the Soviet Union that will try to catch Soviet missiles with directed energy (lasers, particle beams, kinetic energy) -- that, whether it succeeds or not, it is going to produce a new generation of offensive space weapons. That's what they're worried about.

DONALDSON: Well, the Soviet position going into the summit is that unless we give on SDI, they will not give on reducing offensive weapons. Do you think they'll hang tough on that?

SHULMAN: Yes, I do. I think they have to. If our positions were reversed, if they said to you, "We're now working on weapons in space, and with directed energy," which they have not been doing -- they've been doing a lot of research on other things -- our natural response would be that we're not going to cut our offensive missiles in the face of that kind of an action.

DONALDSON: Well, if you think they're going to hang tough on that, it must follow that you believe for any progress to be made on arms control, President Reagan must somehow compromise what he has said about going forward with SDI research and development, but stopping short of deployment.

SHULMAN: That is right. If the President were willing to continue the program of fundamental research on SDI but draw the line, for the time being, at development and testing, which is provided for in the SDI program, I think then we could come out of this summit with very substantial reductions in offensive missiles.

DONALDSON: What makes you think he'll do that? Or do you think Mr. Reagan will compromise that way?

SHULMAN: I have no idea. You people in Washington would know better than I.

BRINKLEY: Well, we'll see.

Now, Professor, I've been reading some of your writing, and I always enjoy it. And one point you have made over and over is that the American people do not understand or fully appreciate that there have been changes in the Soviet Union since Joe Stalin. The level of brutality, and so on, has been reduced. But still, it is an aggressive and expansionist country. It is, to some extent, in Nicaragua, Cuba, Ethiopia, Vietnam, South Yemen, Afghanistan.

All the talk going into this summit is about arms. Shouldn't there be some talk about this?

SHULMAN: Sure there should. It's an important part of our relationship and it's one of the things that made the detente in 1970 collapse, because of the Soviet activism in Africa.

Look, Mr. Brikey, there is no one, I think, who really believes that the Soviet Union is a liberal democracy or that it doesn't have expansionist tendencies. The point is that they've been fairly pragmatic about where they move in and where they don't. They make careful calculations of risks and cost. Where we have been successful in making sure that aggression would not be successful, they have not pushed ahead.

Now, our problem is not to give them those opportunities.

Now, in all the Third World problems that we have to resolve, part of our problem, the main part of our problem has to do with the circumstances in the local areas. The reason that they pushed into Angola was because of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial holdings while we were still attached to the Portuguese as a NATO partner. In Ethiopia it was because of a revolution that opened the way for them.

Now, if they will do that, there's no doubt that it has expansionist tendencies. Here's a country that is coming into a virile phase of its development. It's going to press against the existing configuration of power. But Gorbachev is a pragmatic man and he's cautious. He's not going to take high risks. And he's not a softie. He's not a liberal. The kind of changes he's talking about are not in any sense liberalization of the country. What he's talking about is raising productivity, improving the

modernization of industrial technology.

For him, what he needs is relative quiescence on the international front in order to do that. That's his priority.

DONALDSON: Why should we help him do that?

SHULMAN: Well, it's a question -- was that from Mr. Will?

BRINKLEY: That's Sam Donaldson.

SHULMAN: Oh. All right.

Really, the question is, what do you think the long-term prospects are? I'm not sure that we should help him at the present time in great amount. Clearly, it makes no sense for us to transfer high technology to the Soviet Union in the present period. There isn't a basis of confidence or trust in either direction. But the question is whether we should oppose it.

The main question now for us at the summit is not that one, really. The question is, where is our best security interest? Are we better off, in terms of our security, in having an unregulated nuclear military competition, which will certainly flow out of this summit as it is now likely to come about; or would we be better off to moderate the nuclear military competition between the two countries, even while competition in all respects is likely to continue?

BRINKLEY: Professor Shulman, thank you. Thank you very much for giving us your views today. Enjoyed having you with us.

Coming next, Ambassador Paul Nitze, senior adviser to President Reagan on arms control.

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BRINKLEY: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for coming in. Happy to have you with us today.

Now, we got the news last night, I think it was, that it has been agreed there will be no communique issued at the end of the Geneva summit. Communiques usually, when a meeting ends, tell what they agreed on, and perhaps sometimes they've exaggerated a bit. In this case, no communique.

What does that mean, that we don't expect much to happen?

PAUL NITZE: Not necessarily. But it is really a

difficult thing to get an agreement at this time between the Soviet Union and ourselves on the full range of subjects that we discussed at Moscow. It really is extremely difficult. And rather than have a communique full of their positions and our positions, perhaps it's better not to have that kind of a long, complicated document.

BRINKLEY: Why is it so difficult not? Any more difficult than it always is?

NITZE: It's always difficult. But we were hopeful that it would be possible to move together on a wide range of issues, not necessarily solely on arms control, not necessarily solely on space and defense arms control, but on the full range of bilateral and regional issues.

DONALDSON: Well, does this mean we've also given up the hope that we could produce what you called the other day some guidelines for negotiations on arms control?

NITZE: I think not. We're still hopeful that it will be possible to give some degree of impetus to the negotiators in Geneva. We think the negotiation should take place at Geneva between their negotiators and ours. The problems involved are such that you can't get agreement that you could really rely on just on general principles. You really ought to understand what would happen in the future with the details, with the implementation thereof.

DONALDSON: But do you still believe you could produce some guidelines, or we could in Geneva, that would actually narrow the differences rather than state both sides' positions on the issues?

NITZE: We hope that it would be possible. Because, after all, there is a degree of agreement between us in this field. We also accept the idea of reductions of 50 percent. We differ with them, and differ strongly with them, on the things to which they associate the 50 percent reductions.

BRINKLEY: That is 50 percent of...

NITZE: But we don't differ on the 50 percent.

BRINKLEY: Fifty percent of what?

[Confusion of voices]

WILL: Let me go back just for a minute to the question of the communique. It's well known that we submitted a draft to the Soviet Union of a final communique and that they objected to it. Can you give us some idea of what they had to object to?

NITZE: There were objections to virtually every item on the draft. We really looked upon it more as a checklist of the issues which we wanted to discuss at Moscow. And so the Secretary went down each one of the items in that communique to see the degree of convergence that we could achieve. And it turned out it wasn't that much.

WILL: You've been dealing with Russians, I suppose, as much as anyone in American public life over the last two generations. I would like to ask a human question. You're immersed in the details and technicalities all the time. What is it -- what goes through your mind as you talk to these people, negotiating yet another agreement, knowing, as the President has stated, that they have violated virtually every agreement they've signed in your lifetime? And here you go to negotiate another one. What possible way can you have of hoping to stop that with language?

NITZE: There are certain types of agreements that we've made in the past in which the essence of the agreement has been abided to by both sides. If you look back, for instance, upon the limited test ban treaty. Granted, that the main drive for that agreement was to stop the pollution of space with the fallout from those big tests, particularly that the Soviets were conducting. We did achieve that. There really hasn't been any increase in the fallout. In fact, there's been a decrease in the nuclear fallout in the atmosphere since that agreement. So we did achieve a result in that agreement.

I think that the nonproliferation treaty also has -- at least it's been concurrent with a smaller degree of expansion of the number of nuclear powers than was anticipated at the time.

WILL: But those are not the central agreements of U.S.-Soviet...

NITZE: It's more difficult when you get to the central agreements. Frankly, it was my view that the -- and is my view that the ABM treaty was a useful and is a useful agreement, provided we can get the Soviets to abide by its clear intent and the specific requirements of its language.

WILL: Does the clear intent and specific requirements ban SDI?

NITZE: No. It depends what you're talking about with respect to SDI. The word "research" is never used in the ABM treaty. We did not think at the time we were negotiating that treaty that it was possible in any verifiable way to limit research. And the Soviets didn't, either. Now that we think it is possible to devise detailed limitations upon systems based

upon what we called other physical principles -- in other words, technology which was then not understood. We couldn't work out the ways of limiting the major of components of such systems because we didn't know what they were.

WILL: But they are violating, you would agree, all the major arms control agreements we've signed with them: SALT I, SALT II, and the ABM treaty, not to mention Helsinki. They're in comprehensive violation of it.

NITZE: I believe that to be correct.

WILL: So let's go back. What goes through your mind when you're talking to these guys? Do you say, "Here we go again"?

NITZE: They're not violating all the provisions. They are violating certain of the provisions.

For instance, with respect to SALT II, which, incidentally, is not in effect. It's been not undercut by both sides, but it is not a valid, legal agreement.

WILL: But it is being undercut by them in their deployment of two new missiles, is it not?

NITZE: It is indeed. And it is, we think, in other respects undercut.

WILL: Isn't our compliance unilateral at this point?

NITZE: There is a lot of the agreement which is being complied with.

DONALDSON: Ambassador Nitze, let's go to SDI. You've just heard Professor Shulman suggest that the Soviets won't change their position. Will we change ours?

NITZE: I'm not at all -- I don't agree with Marshall when he says they won't change their position. He was talking about their position on one aspect. I believe he was suggesting that they wouldn't change their position on SDI. I'm not...

DONALDSON: ...framed the question to him in terms of the Soviets have said that they will not seriously discuss reducing offensive weapons until we make concessions on what they see to be our drive toward deployment of SDI.

NITZE: Your question was very specific and precise. But I think Marshall Shulman's answer was directed to not that specific kind of question.

DONALDSON: Well, what do you say? Forget -- I'm sorry I raised Professor Shulman. Do you think that President Reagan will at some point in Geneva make some sort of concessions to ease the way toward guidelines that make sense on nuclear arms by doing something to SDI that the Soviets will accept?

NITZE: He has already laid out certain ways in which we could work out the valid problems that they have with SDI. He has assured them that we would -- are anxious even now to discuss with them the way in which the components of such a system might be introduced, and that the forces of both sides, in a cooperative way, would be stable at each phase.

DONALDSON: But that's after we had conducted not only research, but development, including testing, is it not?

NITZE: It depends what kind of testing you're talking about. There's nothing in the treaty that bars the testing of subcomponents and sensors, for instance. What is barred in the treaty is the testing of mobile launchers, ABM radars, and ABM...

DONALDSON: And am I correct that the President has said now that he would abide to that restrictive, as he puts it, interpretation of the treaty, and therefore not do that testing? Is that correct?

NITZE: The restrictive interpretation of the treaty does permit the testing of such components from land-based facilities. That is permitted under the treaty on the oral interpretation.

DONALDSON: But not into space.

NITZE: Not in space. And he doesn't propose to do that.

BRINKLEY: Mr. Ambassador, Richard Nixon went to Moscow in 1972 and signed the SALT I treaty. He later said he would not have gone to that meeting had he not had a guaranty in advance that the summit meeting would be successful. I mean the deal was made before he went.

No such conditions exist now for this summit, do they?

NITZE: The deal wasn't made before he went in 1972.

BRINKLEY: Well, that's what he said.

NITZE: He may have said it, but it wasn't so. The final negotiations -- some of the important parts of that treaty were negotiated while he was there in Moscow in 1972.

He may have said that, but that isn't so.

BRINKLEY: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much for coming in today. A pleasure to have you with us.